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  Interregional spatial linkages between South Dakota and Nebraska cash markets for 
slaughter cattle are investigated. Econometric procedures are used to test whether a thinning 
market effect or strategic price reporting behavior by packers has degraded market transparency 
under the voluntary price reporting system. Empirical evidence suggests transparency was not 
degraded.    
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  Recent passage of mandatory livestock price reporting legislation at the federal level is the 
direct result of concerns raised over the reliability of the voluntary price reporting system to 
promote price discovery.
1   This legislation ended individual state mandatory livestock price 
reporting regimes and discontinued the voluntary reporting of slaughter cattle sales occurring in 
regional markets by the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS).
2    
  Structural change occurring in the livestock industry over the last fifty years has often 
been cited as the reason for the need to reform the price reporting mechanism for livestock 
markets.  Specific issues raised are: 1) price and market transparency have been degraded as a 
result of industry participants failing to report an estimated 35 to 40 percent of all cattle 
transactions (USDA-AMS 2000) because the AMS reported only confirmed transactions to the 
public;  2) there is a propensity for buyers and sellers in the cash market to behave strategically 
when voluntarily reporting market transactions,
3 and 3) captive supply inventories have a 
 
 
1 Increased concentration in both the packing and feedlot industries, the use of alternative marketing 
arrangements (marketing agreements, forward contracts, etc.), has resulted in the movement away from terminal 
market transactions by market participants over the last 30 years. In the spot market for cattle, the use of terminal 
markets has declined from 30% in 1977 to 13% in 1999 (GIPSA 2002).  Furthermore, the four largest packers 
control 82% of steer and heifer slaughter but only purchase 3.7% of total slaughter from terminal markets. A 
number of economists have concluded that these structural changes in the cattle industry have resulted in thinning 
markets.  Possible consequences include, hampering price discovery, reducing market transparency, and degrading 
the effectiveness of the voluntary price reporting system.  See for example Bastian et al.  (2001) or Azzam (2003).  
 
2   National mandatory livestock price reporting legislation was passed in October 1999 and superseded 
state legislation. The first federal publicly issued mandatory price report was released on April 2, 2001, ending 
individual state reporting activity.  Regional AMS voluntary livestock reports also ended at this time, e.g. Montana 
Direct, Washington/Oregon Direct, etc. 
 
3 Koontz (1999) suggested that packers and feedlots are more likely to withhold transaction information 
during periods of sharp price movements.  This type of behavior would increase price uncertainty during these 
periods.  4
                                                
propensity to create thin markets upon which public voluntary price reports are based.
4 These 
concerns have raised doubts about the ability of the voluntary price reporting system to engender 
market efficiency and promote competition in livestock markets.  However, the robustness of the 
voluntary price reporting system, as a price transmission mechanism, has not been empirically 
investigated in the literature.  This issue is addressed in this study. 
  Efficient price transmission implies the provision of timely and accurate price information 
to market participants and is vital to maintaining efficient livestock markets.  Our objective is to 
investigate the AMS voluntary price reporting system to determine if it was an efficient 
mechanism for the transmission of price information to live-cattle cash markets in South Dakota 
and Nebraska.  We develop a descriptive theoretical framework identifying the potential spatial 
linkages between South Dakota and Nebraska cash markets.  The hypothesized spatial linkages 
allow us to empirically test if the Agricultural Marketing News Service regional voluntary price 
report for Nebraska (AMS 1999-2001) was an efficient conduit for price transmission between 
Nebraska and South Dakota cash markets based on the criteria presented in a recent paper by 
Barrett and Li (2002).  
  The findings of this empirical investigation will contribute to the public discourse on the 
decision to eliminate all federal voluntary public price reports in the slaughter cattle industry.  A 
key issue is whether the former voluntary livestock price reporting system did provide timely and 
accurate market price information to cash market participants. Currently, the states of New 
Mexico, Nebraska, and Texas have voluntary price reports being issued.  The existence of these 
state voluntary price reports indicates a perceived need for additional public information that 
 
 
4 The concept of a thin market in this context refers to the decline in cash transactions as a percentage of 
total transactions (Tomek 1980).   5
                                                
could be provided on a voluntary basis and disseminated by the AMS in conjunction with the 
current mandatory price reporting series.  However, the robustness of a voluntary system is still a 
point of contention. Public discourse on this issue should intensify because legislative 
authorization for federal mandatory price reporting expires in October, 2004.   
Price Transparency in Livestock Markets 
  Market transparency refers to a market environment where all relevant information on 
market conditions is publicly available to all market participants.  One important component of 
market transparency is the concept of price transparency. Price transparency is defined as a 
market condition where all relevant information on transaction prices are publicly available to all 
market participants.  The goal of public price reporting is to provide accurate and timely market 
price reporting Lawrence et. al  (1996).  Accurate and timely market price reports are necessary 
for adequate price discovery, and the promotion of market efficiency Ward (1987). 
  A number of studies in the literature on mandatory and voluntary price reporting have 
questioned the accuracy of the former AMS voluntary public price reporting system relative to a 
mandatory livestock price reporting regime (Anderson et al 1998, Bastian et al 2001, Azzam 
2003).  These studies assert that moving to a mandatory price reporting system will improve the 
availability of public information dramatically.
5 A common theoretical linkage in this literature is 
that by reducing price uncertainty, you increase market efficiency.  These studies basically 
assume Tomek’s thinning market phenomenon was occurring in the voluntary price reporting 
mechanism and increased price uncertainty.   They demonstrate that a full information system is 
 
 
5  The implementation of mandatory price reporting in the market for slaughter cattle has dramatically 
improved the public information set for non-spot market transactions.  However, the focus in this study is only on 
cash transactions in South Dakota and Nebraska, and if the AMS voluntary price reporting system provided accurate 
and timely price information to South Dakota producers marketing live slaughter cattle in the cash market.   6
more efficient because it reduces price uncertainty relative to an incomplete information system.  
The implication of a thinning market phenomenon is that price transparency is degraded in that 
market and this will affect economic behavior.  However, to empirically verify their hypothesis of 
a thinning market, actual market transaction data collected simultaneously from a mandatory and 
voluntary price reporting agency would have to be compared to establish increasing price 
dispersion occurring, over time, in the voluntary price reporting system.  That data does not exist. 
  Recent literature on the relationship between competitive spatial equilibrium and market 
integration (Barrett and Li 2002, McNew 1996, McNew and Fackler 1997) provides an alternative 
methodology for analyzing the robustness of price transparency within the context of mandatory 
versus voluntary price reporting. When interregional trade is nonnegative, Barrett and Li note that 
a long-run competitive spatial equilibrium condition holds when marginal profit from arbitrage 
activity is equal to zero.  Under this condition, when trade is positive, regional price differentials 
move “one-for-one with the costs of spatial arbitrage” in the long-run.  On the other hand, market 
integration, as discussed in the contestable market literature “implies the transfer of Walrasian 
excess demand from one market to another, manifest in the physical flow of a commodity, the 
transmission of price shocks from one market to another, or both ,” (Barrett and Li p.293).  
Market integration requires an efficient short-run market adjustment mechanism restoring a 
market to its long-run equilibrium condition.  In the framework developed below for investigating 
the relationship between mandatory and voluntary price reports, the test for market integration 
will be based on if there is evidence of the efficient transmission of price shocks from one market 
to another.  We contend that Barrett and Li’s definition of market integration implies price  7
                                                
transparency.  Next, a theoretical framework is developed incorporating the two different types of 
price reporting regimes.    
Regional Mandatory Price Reporting Regimes 
  The purpose of regional (state) mandatory livestock price reporting laws (now defunct) is 
to require all livestock transactions to be reported to the designated government agency.  In 
theory, this implies complete price transparency in cash markets.  The price revealed in a 
mandatory public price report ( Pt
MA) for region (state) A, in period t, equals the actual weighted 
average market price (Pt
A)  for direct sales in period t for the reporting region plus a random error:  
(1)   P
MA(It
A) = Pt
A  + ￿t.
6    
The symbol I denotes the information set containing all transaction data generated in region A and 
collected by the price reporting agency.  The variable (￿) denotes random error occurring in the 
data collection and reporting process.  If one assumes full industry compliance (complete 
information), then: E(￿t ￿It
A)=0, VAR(￿t￿It
A ) = ￿
2




7 Assuming the 
government’s data collection procedures adhere to standardized collection and evaluation 
practices, then Barrett and Li’s definition of an integrated relationship between  Pt
A and  Pt
MA 
exists in the context of a price reporting relationship. 
Voluntary Price Reporting Regimes    
 
 
6 This assumption assumes full compliance with price reporting regulations by all market participants.  The 
assumption that the expected value of collected transaction prices is an unbiased estimate of equilibrium price is 
consistent with Tomek (1980).  It is assumed transaction costs associated with price reporting are zero and so the 
intercept term is dropped. 
 
7 Note that the mathematical operators  E and VAR are conditional expectation and variance operators, 
respectively.  8
                                                
   The information set ( It
B ) contains transaction price information, for region B, voluntarily 
reported to the price reporting agency.  The information set determines the price revealed in the 
public voluntary price report (Pt




B  + ￿t .  
Pt
B is the actual market weighted average transaction price in region B, and ￿t  is the random error 
term resulting from random error in the data collection and reporting process.  Next, let it be 
assumed that the voluntary price reporting system draws a large enough sample when 
constructing It
B that the sample is representative of the market and therefore the voluntary price 
reports are an efficient conduit for the transmission of market information on slaughter cattle 
transactions in region B.
8 This implies: E(Pt
VB￿It
B)= Pt





￿t.  Assuming the government’s data collection procedures adhere to standardized 
collection and evaluation practices, then Barrett and Li’s definition of an integrated relationship 
between  Pt
B and  Pt
VB exists in the context of a price reporting relationship. 




￿t assumptions, if one or both are false, this 
implies that either E(￿t￿It
B)≠0 or VAR(￿t￿It
B) changes as the content of the information set 
changes or both.
9  These types of potential flaws in the AMS public voluntary price reporting 
 
 
8Azzam (2003, p.388) discusses transparency in terms of reduced uncertainty over livestock prices under a 
mandatory system relative to voluntary price reporting as a result of increased market information. The underlying 
premise of Azzam’s assumption is that increased uncertainty is the result of fewer transactions being reported under a 
voluntary system resulting in increased price dispersion relative to actual dispersion of market transaction prices.  In 
simple terms, Azzam refers to the issue as analogous to a sampling issue.  
 




B , the voluntary price report is biased.  If there are 
transactions not reported, then the content of the information set declines as the proportion of transactions reported 
declines (thinning markets), causing the variance of the estimated equilibrium transaction price (VAR(￿t￿It
B)) to 
increase (Tomek 1980).  The thinning market assumption is the unifying behavioral assumption linking together the 
earlier studies found in this literature. If the missing information is nonrandom, then the distribution of the 
information set may be skewed relative to the distribution of actual transactions occurring in the market.  This may 
result in bias voluntary public price reports.    9
                                                
system have been alluded to by the proponents of federal mandatory price reporting.  For 
example: 1) If buyers and sellers of slaughter cattle are behaving strategically when reporting 
transaction prices, then ￿t will not have a constant mean over time, and 2) if the volume of 
transactions being reported is diminished to the point of affecting the distribution of the voluntary 
price report then ￿t will experience an increase in its variance over time. If either one of these 
conditions or both are present, then the relationship between Pt
VB and  Pt
B will not be stationary.  
This implies the voluntary price report will not have a long-run equilibrium relationship with 
actual market transactions.  In this case, it is not possible for the two price series to be integrated 
and price transparency is nonexistent.  This implies the voluntary price reporting system is 
fundamentally flawed as implied in the earlier literature.   
Interregional Slaughter Cattle Production and Interregional Spatial Equilibrium  
  Assume regions A and B are two spatially related regions for the production of slaughter 
cattle. Assume the production capacity of slaughter cattle in region A is defined as being small 
relative to B.  Assume region B is defined as a centralized market, and region A as a decentralized 
market.
10 The difference between the two regions is slaughter cattle production capacity and: a) 
region B has processing facilities and a voluntary public price reporting regime, and b) region A 
has a mandatory public price reporting regime and no processing facilities.  Assume region A 
produces an excess supply of slaughter cattle because of a lack of processing facilities.  Assume 
region B has excess demand for slaughter cattle due to processing facilities having excess 
capacity.  Producers in region A have a choice of selling their live cattle to a field representative 
of a processing firm located in region B or selling their cattle in region A to an intermediary 
 
 
10 The term centralized infers the ability of a region to produce, market,  and process slaughter cattle 
internally. (independent order buyer).  The intermediary will assume the risk of delivering the cattle to the 
processing facility in region B and profit from any short-run arbitrage activity.  Therefore, all 
slaughter cattle flow from region A to region B.
11   
   Next, assume the market for slaughter cattle is competitive in regions A&B.  This implies 
that opportunities for interregional arbitrage dissipate quickly.
12 This infers that the cash markets 
for slaughter cattle in regions A&B are spatially integrated and this relationship can be defined 
as: 
(3)   Pt
A = α + Pt
B + ψt , where α is the intercept term capturing transactions cost and ψt is the 
random error term and E(ψt) = 0 and Var(ψt) = ￿
2
ψt . 
  Diagram I depicts the spatial relationships between interregional markets and between 





Diagram I: Interregional Markets and the Direction of Price Transmission. 
 
             Price reporting regime                  Regional Cash Market                         
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Region A    P
MA      ◄ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ P
A
                                                        ▲                                    ▲ 
    
    
 
   # 4      # 3  
                                                 
 
11 The discussion reflects the production and marketing of slaughter cattle in South Dakota.  There are no 
modern commercial beef packing plants in South Dakota.  A large majority of South Dakota slaughter cattle are 
shipped out of state for processing. 
 
12 This implies the long-run competitive spatial equilibrium is consistent with marginal profit from arbitrage 
activity being equal to zero. This assumption is consistent with Barrett and Li, and Mc New and Fackler.  
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                                                        ▼ 
Region B     P
VB       ◄ ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ P
B   
  (NEB)      # 2       
 
  The  line #1 represents the spatial relationship and direction of price transmission between actual and 
re  transactions resulting from government enforcement of mandatory price reporting regulations in region ported  A: 
eq. 1.  The line #2 represents the possible spatial relationship between actual and voluntary reported transaction prices 
released by the reporting agency in region B: eq 2.  The line #3 represents the assumed spatially integrated 
relationship between regions A&B due to spatial arbitrage: eq 3. The line #4 represents the possible interregional 
spatial relationship between the mandatory price report in region A and the voluntary price report in region B eq 4. 
  
 
  The spatial relationships defined by equations 1, 2, and 3 are unobservable.  The spatial 
relationship between actual market transaction prices and published mandatory price reports as 
defined in eq. 1, and depicted in diagram I, is assumed to adhere to the conditions necessary for 
spatial equilibrium to occur because of government enforcement of mandatory price reporting 
regulations in region A.  The spatial relationship between actual market transaction prices and 
published voluntary price reports as defined in eq. 2, and depicted in diagram I, is assumed to 
adhere to the conditions necessary for spatial equilibrium to occur because the government 
collection of voluntarily reported transaction data is assumed to be accurate and hence 
government voluntary price reports are an accurate reflection of actual market conditions in 
region B.  The interregional spatial relationship defined in eq. 3, and depicted in diagram I is 
assumed to attain spatial equilibrium because competitive spatial arbitrage and one-way trade 
exists between regions A&B.
13   
                                                 
 
13 The Barrett and Li necessary conditions for long-run spatial competitive equilibrium to exist between 
regions A&B are one-way trade and zero marginal profits to arbitrage in the long-run. 
  12
  The interregional spatial relationship between region A’s mandatory price report and 
region B’s voluntary price report depicted in diagram I is defined as follows: 
(4)  Pt
MA = a + Pt
VB + et, where “a” denotes the intercept term, and  et is the random error 
term. 
  The existence of a long-run spatial equilibrium for the interregional spatial relationship 
defined in eq. 4 is solely dependant on what is assumed about the nature of the spatial 
relationships defined by equations 1, 2, & 3.   If any of the spatial relationships defined by 
equations 1, 2, & 3 fail to yield a long-run spatial equilibrium condition, then it is not possible 
for an interregional spatial equilibrium relationship to exist between the mandatory price report 
in region A and the voluntary price report in region B.   
  We assert that the interregional spatial relationships developed above reflect the 
relationship between the Nebraska and South Dakota cash markets before federal mandatory 
price regulations went into effect.  The above discussion allows the first testable hypothesis to 
be introduced:  If the spatial relationships defined by equations, 1, 2, & 3 are consistent with 
the conditions necessary to sustain long-run spatial equilibrium, then the mandatory price 
report in South Dakota and the voluntary price report in Nebraska have a long-run spatial 
equilibrium relationship. 
    Empirically, spatial equilibrium is a long-run concept which requires certain conditions 
to be present in the spatial relationship of two time series variables.   Empirically, for the 
condition of long-run spatial equilibrium to occur in the spatial relationship defined by equation  13
                                                
4, statistical evidence of a cointegrated relationship between  Pt
MA and Pt
VB  is necessary.
14 If a 
cointegrated relationship between  Pt
MA and Pt
VB is not present, then a long-run spatial 
equilibrium relationship does not exist for the spatial relationships defined by equations 2&3.   
    To develop this point further, assume competitive spatial arbitrage between South 
Dakota and Nebraska markets is robust, and that the South Dakota Mandatory price reporting 
regime was accurate.  Given the absence of cointegration, we can draw a conclusion from 
rejecting the null hypothesis that the voluntary price reporting mechanism for public reporting 
of Nebraska live cattle cash transactions was flawed before federal mandatory price reporting 
was implemented.    
Interregional Spatial Integration and Price Transparency 
   According to the recent literature (e.g. Barret and Li), market integration is defined as the 
ability of linked markets to transfer changes in market supply and demand conditions from one 
market to another via the transmission of price shocks.  Efficient transmission of price shocks is 
consistent with the definition of price transparency requiring the market mechanism to provide 
accurate and timely price information to market participants.   
  Long-run spatial equilibrium is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence 
of price transparency.   In the last section it was postulated that if an interregional long-run 
spatial equilibrium relationship exists between Pt
MA and Pt
VB, then a long-run spatial relationship 
must also exist for the other three spatial relationships (diagram I).  Applying the same logic to 
 
 
14 The literature (Barrett and Li, McNew, McNew and Flacker, etc)  indicates that linear cointegration 
techniques are inadequate when transactions cost are not stationary, trade is bidirectional, or trade is discontinuous.  
Only the issue of nonstationary transactions costs poses a potential problem.  The other two potential problems are 
not relevant to the theoretical framework developed in this paper. However, empirical results discussed later indicate 
that transactions costs are stationary.   14
                                                
test if the spatial relationships (as illustrated in diagram I) are spatially integrated leads us to the 
second testable hypothesis: If the spatial relationships defined by equations, 1, 2, & 3 are 
spatially integrated, then the mandatory price report in South Dakota and the voluntary price 
report in Nebraska are spatially integrated. 
  To test if the AMS voluntary price reporting system did fully transmit price shocks from 
one region to another in a timely fashion, an error correction model (ECM) is constructed to test 
the robustness of the short-run equilibrium interregional price shock adjustment mechanism to 
determine if the mandatory price reporting series in region A (South Dakota) and the voluntary 
price reporting series in region B (Nebraska) are spatially integrated.   
  Adopting the ECM framework to model the price transmission process in the interregional 
cash market will allow us to define the price transmission process (eq. 5).  According to Granger 
(1981, 1983), two cointegrated series (eq. 4) can be expressed as a simple error correction model: 
(5)  ∆ Pt
MA =  γ0 + γ1 ∆ Pt
VB + γ2 et-1.   
  The change in the equilibrium price of slaughter cattle from period t-1 to t in region A is 
reflected in ∆ Pt
MA. The change in the equilibrium price of slaughter cattle from period t-1 to t 
in region B is reflected in ∆ Pt
VB.  The intercept term γ0  (γ0= ∆a ) reflects changes in the long-
run equilibrium relationship due to the effect of the price shock on transaction cost levels.
15 The 
slope parameter γ1 ( 0≤  γ1  ≤1) captures the transmission of the price shock occurring in region 
B, in time period t, to region A.  If γ1=1, then this would indicate “instantaneous perfect 
integration” as defined by Barrett and Li.  However, a weaker condition discussed by Barrett and 
Li is “perfect integration” which only requires that the entire price shock be transmitted, without a 
 
 
15 Barrett and Li discuss the effect of nonstationary transaction costs on the robustness on linear ECM 
models.  We assume γ0=0, and empirical evidence presented later in the paper supports this assumption. specific duration-of-time constraint.  The variable et-1 reflects the deviation from parity remaining 
to be transmitted from region B to region A as a result of the price shock at time t.  The deviation 
from parity adjustment parameter γ2 ( 0 ≤ γ2  ≤1) captures the transmission of the price shock 
residual to region A.      
  The interregional ECM modeling of the price shock transmission process is done in a 
discrete time framework to determine if the time-path of the adjustment process is consistent with 
Barrett and Li’s definition of perfect integration.  First, assume that the spatial relationships 
outlined in diagram I are integrated and assume a fixed proportion of the price shock (γ1 = γ2) is 
transmitted from region B to region A each period, and γ0 =0.
16   Next, assume a price shock at 
time t occurs in region B.  The price shock disrupts the long run equilibrium between regional 
transaction prices Pt
A and Pt
B .  This disruption will be reflected in the respective price reports; 
Pt
MA and Pt





VB .   
  In period t+1, the proportion of the price shock transmitted to region A is the residual et-1 
multiplied by γ1. Where et-1 = ￿Pt
VB -  γ1∆Pt
VB is the residual of the price shock not yet transmitted 
to region A.   The transmission process continues until the entire shock is transmitted to region A.  
Rewriting the price shock transmission process in a compact form allows us to define the spatial 
price transmission equation: 















                                                 
 
16 We assume the market mechanism for the transmission of price shocks across regions is time invariant.  
Empirical evidence presented later indicates the fixed proportion assumption is robust.   Equation 7 confirms that the proposed ECM framework is consistent with Barret and Li’s 
definition of perfect integration occurring between regions A and B whenever γ0=0, and 
0<γ1<1.
17   Instantaneous perfect integration occurs whenever i=0,  γ0=0, γ1 = γ2 , and γ1 =1.  This 
type of integration is the type one would associate with financial markets.  Barret and Li’s 
segmented equilibrium would occur if γ0=0,  γ1 =0, and no movement of slaughter cattle from 
region A to B.  
 Empirical  estimation of parameters γ1 and γ2 in eq. 5 will provide statistical evidence of 
whether spatial integration existed between Pt
MA and Pt
VB .   If both γ1 and γ2 are statistically 
significant then we can concluded all of the spatial relationships in diagram I are integrated.  The 
implication under this scenario is that the AMS Nebraska voluntary price report did engender 




  For South Dakota and Nebraska, we intend to empirically investigate the spatial 
relationships hypothesized in diagram I for the time period just before federal mandatory price 
reporting rules went into effect.  A test for the presence of cointegration will provide empirical 
evidence on the possible existence of  long-run spatial equilibrium relationships discussed above 
(diagram I).  If a long-run equilibrium relationship is found, then an error correction 
 16
                                                 
)  
17 Given that   = 1, and thus  .   Therefore, Barret and 

























                                                
mechanism (ECM) modeling approach will be used to investigate the short-run disequilibrium 
adjustment process to determine if there is empirical evidence of spatial integration. 
  First,  unit root tests will be conducted to determine which of the selected price series 
are non-stationary.
18  Engle and Granger (1987) state that if two series are I(1) then it is 
possible that a linear combination of the two series is I(0). Engle and Granger propose a 
cointegrating regression: regressing one I(1) series on another I(1) series.    The residual series 
generated by the cointegration regression will be tested for the existence of a unit root to 
determine if the two price series are cointegrated.  Next, based on the work by Granger (1981, 
1983), the Granger Representation Theorem states that if two time series variables are 




  In July of 1999 South Dakota Codified Law: Chapter 40-15B (SDCL 2000) required 
mandatory livestock price reporting in South Dakota to begin on Sept 1, 1999.  The legislation 
required that all private livestock transactions were to be reported to the South Dakota 
Department of Agriculture.  The Department of Agriculture collected data until federal 
mandatory price reporting began. The Secretary of Agriculture’s office supplied all of the 
collected mandatory reporting data used in this study.  The South Dakota mandatory price 
reporting data was used to construct a daily price series for all live weight steer transactions 
 
 
18 For a discussion of unit root testing procedures and testing for cointegration between non-stationary 
time series variables see Gujarati (2003).   18
                                                
occurring in the state during the 19-month period prior to implementation of federal mandatory 
price reporting.  This data provides a unique opportunity to test if voluntary public price 
reporting system reflected actual market conditions during the period just prior to the 
implementation of federal mandatory price reporting.  
  The South Dakota Mandatory Price Reporting data set contains 80 weeks of daily 
weighted average price data (142 transaction days) for the direct sale of live steers in South 
Dakota.   The data set contains 59,614 head and 300 recorded transactions.
19 The AMS  
voluntary price series selected is the Nebraska Daily Direct Weighted Average report.  The two 




Empirical Results: Testing for Unit Roots and Cointegration 
  
  Table I presents the Dicky-Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test 
statistics, the associated p-values for the unit root tests, for each of the price series.  The test 
statistic for detecting the presence of serial correlation is either the Durbin-Watson d or 
Durbin’s t, depending on if a lagged dependent variable was needed to whiten the error 
structure of the unit root test.  Lagged terms were added to the ADF equation until the error 
structure was empirically verified as whitened.  The unit root tests are based on the null 
hypothesis that a price series has a unit root and is non-stationary versus the alternative that the 
 
 
19   The mandatory price reporting data set supplied to the Dept. of Economics at SDSU by the State of 
South Dakota contains transaction data on over 600,000 head of cattle. Dressed weight sales, grid sales, forward 
contract sales, marketing agreement transactions, heifer and Holstein transactions were excluded from the sample. 
Voluntary price report data collected from various issue of the AMS Livestock, Meat and Wool Weekly Summary 
and Statistics report (1999-2001).  19
                                                
series does not have a unit root and is stationary.
20 The unit root hypothesis test results indicate 
that both price series are non-stationary (Table I). The cointegration results are presented in 
Table II.   
 
 
20 If serial correlation was not detected in the initial DF test, then the autoregressive order is zero. If serial 
correlation was detected then the appropriate ADF test was used.   
TABLE I 
UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS 
                                     
      Price                  Obs.         Tau            P-Value      
 20
        Series                        Statistic            
                     Nebraska Daily Direct     142     -0.80    0.81         
          Weighted-Average report.
1   
 
           South Dakota Mandatory    142            -1.34    0.61          
           Price Reporting Data.
2                                                        
                               
1. The order of the autoregressive model selected for the ADF test is AR(0).  DW d test stat=1.68 
2  . The order of the autoregressive model selected for the ADF test is AR(1).  Durbin’s t= -1.27 
  
TABLE II 
SDMPR COINTEGRATION  TEST RESULTS 
                                     
       Price Series    Number      Cointegrating Regression      Tau   P-Value 
       Cointegrating     Of           Intercept      Parameter      Statistic 
        Regressions       Obs.
21        Estimate      Estimate 
                     
                 SDMPR &     
                 Nebraska Daily      142    5.14         0.917         -9.27       0.001 
      Dir. Wt. Avg.
1  
      
 
    1. The order of the autoregressive model selected for the ADF test is AR(0).  DW d test stat = 2.025. 
 
The empirical evidence suggests a long-run spatial equilibrium relationship did exist 
between the South Dakota Mandatory price report series and the Nebraska Direct series. We 
concluded there is empirical evidence to support hypothesis 1, and that the long-run spatial 
equilibrium relationships outlined in diagram I did exist in the period just prior to 
implementation of federal mandatory price reporting.  
                                                 
 
21 Statistical analyses were conducted using SAS (1993).   21
  Empirical evidence of the existence of long-run equilibrium relationships, however, does 
not tell us anything about short-run deviations away from equilibrium.  Short-run divergence 
from the long-run equilibrium relationship may result from the alleged flaws in the former 
voluntary price reporting system. The literature clearly indicates that interregional integration 
occurs only if price shocks are completely transmitted from one region to another.  To 
investigate this issue, an error correction mechanism (as discussed earlier) will be employed to 
investigate the effect of short-run anomalies on the empirically established long-run 
relationships discussed above. 
ERROR CORRECTION MODEL 
  In the last section we established empirically that there is statistical evidence of  long-run 
spatial equilibrium conditions present among the South Dakota and Nebraska interregional 
spatial relationships as defined in diagram I.  While the estimated long-run equilibrium 
relationships are statistically significant, there is still the question of whether price integration 
exists across these spatial relationships.  The literature indicates that sustained short-run 
deviations from the long-run equilibrium relationship could degrade price (integration) 
transparency and hinder price discovery.  Sustained short-run deviations would be evidence of 
the failure of the voluntary price reporting system to act as an efficient mechanism or conduit 
for the transmission of changing market conditions to the public.   
  An error correction modeling procedure is therefore utilized with the following set of 
premises concerning price determination in the cash market for slaughter steers. It is assumed 
here that the equilibrium cash price of slaughter steers is determined by regional market 
conditions outside of South Dakota.  Packers engaged in the direct cash purchase of live  22
                                                
slaughter steers in South Dakota are aware of the current regional market conditions for beef 
and the transaction costs associated with placing South Dakota steers into the supply channel.  It 
is also assumed here that the trends in transaction and transport costs were relatively flat during 
the time period covered by this study.
22 Given these assumptions, a price shock to the live 
slaughter steer cash market at the regional level will eventually be reflected in the direct price 
paid to South Dakota producers. Simply stated, a price shock of x dollars per cwt. at time t at 
the regional level will disrupt the long-run equilibrium between the regional market price and 
the price paid to South Dakota producers. The disequilibrium condition will persist until the 
South Dakota market fully adjusts to the price shock in some future period t+n, where n is the 
number of periods (transaction days) needed for full adjustment to take place (eq.7). It is during 
this period of disequilibrium that price transparency can be effected.
23 The length of time (n) it 
takes for the transmission of a price shock opens a window of opportunity for profitable 
arbitrage activities to occur in smaller decentralized markets like South Dakota.
24      
 
 
22 During the time period covered by this study the average Midwest retail weekly #2 diesel price per 
gallon was $1.41 and the standard deviation was 12 cents (U.S. Dept. Of Energy, Energy Information 
Administration).   
 
23Koontz (1999) reported that packers and feedlots are more likely to withhold transaction information 
during periods of sharp price movements.  However, empirical evidence does not support this type of market 
disrupting behavior affecting the interregional spatial relationship in this study.  
 
24 The possibility of excess profit potential arising in this type of situation has been alluded to by Goodwin 
and Schroeder (1991) and Tomek (1980).    Based on the work by Granger (1981, 1983), the Granger Representation Theorem states 
that if two time series variables are cointegrated, then the relationship between them can be 
expressed as an error correction mechanism (ECM).  The ECM defined in eq.5 is estimated 
using OLS: 
8)  ∆ Pt
MA =  γ0 + γ1 ∆ Pt
VB + γ2 et-1 + zt ,   




ERROR CORRECTION MODEL OLS ESTIMATES 
                                     
       Price Series           Number         ECM  Regression Estimates 
1                     
       ECM                Of        Intercept      Slope     Speed of 
       Regressions            Obs.          Est.          Est.       Adjustment Est. 
                     
              ∆SDMPR &     
              ∆Nebraska Daily      142           0.03          0.752       -0.755      
 23
           Dir. Wt. Avg.               (0.29)          (6.62)           (-9.16) 
1. Student t test statistics are given in parentheses below the respective parameter estimate. 
  
  Table III indicates that the intercept estimate is statistically zero.  This result implies that 
transaction costs were stationary during the period investigated in this study.  
  Empirical evidence presented in Table III indicates the slope parameter estimate is highly 
significant and has a p-value of less than .001.  The “speed of adjustment” parameter estimate is also 
highly significant and has a p-value of less than .001.  The “speed of adjustment” parameter coefficient 
estimates indicate the proportion of the price-shock-residual remaining after period t that will be 
transmitted to the SDMPR series in period t+1.  The slope and speed of adjustment parameter estimates 
and their respective standard errors are very consistent with the modeling assumption made earlier that ￿1 
                                                 
 
25 The first difference variables used to estimate the ECM were screened for serial correlation (DW: 2.042) 
and stationary, and no diagnostic problems were detected.  = ￿2 .  This implies the institutional structure of the price transmission mechanism is stable. The empirical 
estimates are consistent with Barret and Li’s definition of perfect integration.  
  Robust price integration needed for market transparency and price discovery occurs when a price 
shock completely passes through from one market to another in a timely fashion.  Table IV provides 
empirical estimates for the speed of adjustment process. 
 
TABLE IV 
    SOUTH DAKOTA MANDATORY PRICE REPORTING SERIES:  
  “SPEED OF ADJUSTMENT” OVER TIME TO A PRICE SHOCK AT TIME t 
                                     
    Cointegrating                TIME 
               Regressions         t      t+1      t+2 
       
                                                                                                       
               SDMPR &     
               Nebraska Daily     75.2%    93.98%    98.52%   
    Dir. Wt. Avg.  
  
 
   
 
  The ECM estimates indicates that 94% of a price shock occurring in the Nebraska cash market 
was transmitted to the South Dakota cash market by the next transaction day and 98.5% by day two.  
The empirical evidence indicates that while the AMS voluntary price reporting system did not provide 
instantaneous price transparency, price transparency did exist and was robust.  
Conclusions  and Summary 
  For the period when South Dakota required mandatory livestock reporting, all hypotheses tests 
associated with the cointegration and error correction analysis indicate that: a) South Dakota’s cash 
market for slaughter cattle was spatially integrated with the Nebraska cash market, and b) South 
Dakota’s mandatory price reporting system and the AMS voluntary price reporting system for 
Nebraska’s direct cash sales were robust price reporting mechanisms.  The  conclusion from the 
empirical evidence presented is that in the case of South Dakota and Nebraska, the former voluntary price 
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reporting system did foster price transparency and was a robust mechanism for promoting market 
transparency and price discovery.  
  The debate over whether the former voluntary price reporting system engendered price 
transparency and promoted price discovery is an important question. The uniqueness of the transaction 
data collected under South Dakota’s mandatory price reporting regulations provides an opportunity to 
empirically gauge the robustness of the former AMS voluntary price reporting system before federal 
mandatory price reporting rules came into existence.  All previous studies looking at the reliability of the 
voluntary price reporting system assumed a mandatory price reporting system would reduce price 
uncertainty and thus would eliminate market inefficiency caused by increased uncertainty.  Empirical 
evidence of interregional spatial price transparency suggests that increased uncertainty did not exist at a 
level necessary to negatively affect the cash markets in SD and NE.  Therefore, the potential negative 
consequences discussed in the pervious literature were minimal in the SD and NE cash markets.  
  While our study only covers one small corner of the livestock sector, it raises the question that if 
the former voluntary price reporting system was an efficient mechanism for promoting market 
transparency and price discovery in the cash market for live steers in South Dakota, what about other 
regions and other types of livestock? We are not advocating that the former voluntary price reporting 
system is more robust than the new federal mandatory system, but we are saying there is ample evidence 
that the former system was not as flawed as previous research has suggested. Therefore, it is not 
necessarily valid to justify the need for mandatory price reporting based on the assertion that the former 
voluntary price reporting system degraded price transparency. 
  We conclude that additional research is needed to answer these questions: 1) What are costs and 
benefits associated with the new federal mandatory price reporting system and should they be identified 
before the renewal issue is debated on the floor of Congress, 2) Should voluntary public price reports be 
resumed in regional markets where regional voluntary price reports were discontinued, and 3) Are there  26
other regional cattle markets or other types of  livestock markets where the former voluntary price 
reporting system was an efficient mechanism for promoting market transparency and price discovery? 
Answers to these questions are needed before an informed debate on the current structure of the federal 
mandatory livestock price reporting system can begin.  The question is, are Nebraska and South Dakota the 
exceptions to the general consensus that the former AMS voluntary price reporting regime was 
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